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CRIMINALIZING MATERIAL SUPPORT TO DOMESTIC
TERRORIST ORGANIZATIONS: A NATIONAL SECURITY
IMPERATIVE

Jimmy Gurulé*

INTRODUCTION
Domestic terrorism poses a serious threat to U.S. national security.
According to the Department of Homeland Security (“DHS”), “[i]deologically
motivated lone offenders and small groups pose the most likely terrorist threat to the
Homeland, with Domestic Violent Extremists (“DVEs”) presenting the most
persistent and lethal threat.”1 Since 9/11, right-wing extremists have killed more
people in the U.S. than foreign terrorists.2 Federal Bureau of Investigation (“FBI”)
Director Christopher A. Wray raised these concerns at a hearing before the U.S.
House of Representatives Committee on Homeland Security.3 These self-radicalized
violent extremists are “motivated by a variety of domestic terrorist ideologies, such
as racially- and ethnically-motivated extremism, including white supremacist violent
extremism, anti-government, and anti-authority violent extremism, and other
ideological strains that drive terrorist violence,” according to the Department of
Homeland Security.4 Moreover, racially and ethnically motivated violent extremists,
mostly white supremacists, make up a majority of domestic terrorism threats.5 Wray
testified that the FBI averaged approximately 1,000 domestic terrorism investigations
*
Professor of Law, Notre Dame Law School. The author served as Under Secretary of Enforcement, U.S.
Department of the Treasury from 2001-2003, and played a prominent role in developing the U.S. Government’s
counter-terrorism financing program. I would like to thank Jeffrey Meehan, NDLS ‘22, for his excellent research
assistance and Lauren Vaca, NDLS ‘21, for her invaluable efforts editing the article.
1
DEP’T OF HOMELAND SEC., HOMELAND THREAT ASSESSMENT 17 (2020).
2
Peter Bergen et al., Terrorism in America After 9/11, NEW AM., https://www.newamerica.org/indepth/terrorism-in-america/what-threat-united-states-today/ (last visited Feb. 21, 2021) (stating that 114 people
were killed in attacks by right-wing terrorists in the United States as compared to 107 people killed by
international terrorists).
3
Worldwide Threats to the Homeland Before the H. Comm. on Homeland Sec., 116th Cong. (2020)
[hereinafter Worldwide Threats to the Homeland] (statement of Christopher A. Wray, Director, Federal Bureau
of Investigation).
4
DEP’T OF HOMELAND SEC., STRATEGIC FRAMEWORK FOR COUNTERING TERRORISM AND TARGETED
VIOLENCE 4–5 (2019).
5
Id. at 10.
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and had arrested about 120 domestic terrorism suspects in 2020, which demonstrates
an escalating problem.6 Wray told the committee that white supremacists and antigovernment groups remain the most persistent and lethal threat to the Homeland.7
In January 2021, the Department of Homeland Security issued a National
Terrorism Advisory System Bulletin stating that: "[S]ome ideologically-motivated
violent extremists with objections to the exercise of governmental authority and the
presidential transition, as well as other perceived grievances fueled by false
narratives, could . . . mobilize to incite or commit violence.”8 The DHS terrorism
advisory bulletin warned that DVEs might be targeting elected officials and
government facilities for deadly attack.9 Today, far right, DVE, and anti-government
militia groups pose a greater threat to the Homeland than foreign terrorist
organizations.10
Despite the deadly threat posed by domestic terrorists, there is no federal
statute punishing acts of domestic terrorism. Under 18 U.S.C. § 2331(5), the term
“domestic terrorism” means activities that:
(a) involve acts dangerous to human life that are a violation of criminal
laws of the United States or of any State;
(b) appear to be intended—
(i) to intimidate or coerce a civilian population;
(ii) to influence the policy of a government by intimidation or
coercion; or
(iii) to affect the conduct of a government by mass destruction,
assassination, or kidnaping.11
The prohibited conduct must also occur primarily within the territorial jurisdiction of
the United States.12
However, domestic terrorism is not a punishable offense in the federal
criminal code. Instead, prosecutors must prosecute acts of terrorism under other
federal statutes. Federal prosecutors could charge domestic terrorists with murder,
kidnaping, and other violent crimes if there is federal jurisdiction over the offense. In
the absence of a federal nexus, state authorities would be responsible for prosecuting
the domestic terrorists. Ultimately, federal authorities must identify a federal offense
that punishes the offender consistent with the severity of the crime and the defendant’s
moral culpability. Acts of domestic terrorism are often motivated by antigovernment, racial, ethnic, or religious hatred. However, the substitute federal
offenses may not fully capture the offender’s malevolent purpose in committing the
crime. Furthermore, federal hate crime legislation generally applies only where the
crime affected interstate or foreign commerce or the protected person was
participating in federally protected activity, such as public education, employment,
6

Worldwide Threats to the Homeland, supra note 3.
Id. Wray testified that the FBI views the left-wing anti-fascist movement knowns as Antifa “as more of
an ideology or a movement more than an organization.” Id.
8
DEP’T OF HOMELAND SEC., NATIONAL TERRORISM ADVISORY SYSTEM BULLETIN 1 (Jan. 27, 2021),
https://www.dhs.gov/sites/default/files/ntas/alerts/21_0127_ntas-bulletin.pdf.
9
Id.
10
DEP’T OF HOMELAND SEC., supra note 1, at 18.
11
18 U.S.C. § 2331(5).
12
Id.
7
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travel, or the enjoyment of public accommodations.13 Finally, hate crime laws do not
cover crimes motivated by anti-government animus. Ultimately, existing federal law
is inadequate to deal with the problem. Thus, there is a compelling case for
criminalizing domestic terrorism.
Foreign and domestic terrorist organizations do not act alone. Individuals
who embrace the terrorist organization’s goals, objectives, and ideology enable and
facilitate their unlawful activities. Terrorist sympathizers provide these extremist
groups with funding, weapons, equipment, training, and logistical support. While
these individuals do not directly participate in terrorist attacks, their provision of
material support facilitates these deadly activities. Title 18 U.S.C. § 2339B, prohibits
the provision of “material support or resources” to a “foreign terrorist organization.”14
In enacting material support legislation, Congress made a finding that terrorist
organizations “are so tainted by their criminal conduct that any contribution to such
an organization facilitates that conduct.”15 The same holds true for the provision of
material support to domestic terrorist organizations.
Currently, there is no equivalent federal statute criminalizing material
support for domestic terrorism. Moreover, in the absence of proof that the defendant
acted with the specific intent to commit a particular terrorist crime, the provision of
material support would not be punishable under a theory of aiding and abetting or
conspiracy.16 A terrorist sympathizer could sell weapons and explosives to a rightwing militia group with knowledge of the group’s deadly agenda and avoid criminal
liability by merely claiming that he lacked the specific intent to facilitate the
commission of the predicate crime. Thus, while it is a federal crime to provide
material support or resources to foreign terrorist organization, the provision of
assistance to a domestic terrorist group is not a punishable offense. There is no
compelling reason to distinguish between the provision of material support to foreign
and domestic terrorist groups on this basis. Persons that knowingly provide material
support to domestic terrorist organizations support and sustain these groups and
enable their terrorist-related activities. These persons are equally responsible for acts
of terrorism perpetrated by these extremist groups. As such, they must be held
accountable.
Part I of this Article analyzes the threat to national security posed by rightwing violent extremist groups, focusing on the January 6th, 2021 attack on the U.S.
Capitol, as well as the conspiracy to kidnap Michigan Governor Gretchen Whitmer.
Violent, anti-government militia groups played a central role in both incidents. Part
II examines the ideology and organizational structure of three of the most prominent
domestic terrorist groups, the Oath Keepers, Proud Boys, and Three Percenters, and
13
See Matthew Shepard & James Byrd Jr. Hate Crimes Prevention Act, 18 U.S.C. § 249; Fair Housing
Act, 42 U.S.C. § 3631; Church Arson Prevention Act, 18 U.S.C. §§ 241, 247.
14
18 U.S.C. § 2339B. A violation of the material support statute is punishable by twenty years in prison.
15
Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-132, § 301(a)(7), 110 Stat.
1214, 1247 (1996).
16
See MODEL PENAL CODE, § 2.06(3)(a) (providing that a person is an accomplice of another person in
the commission of an offense if “with the purpose of promoting or facilitating the commission of the offense,
he . . . aids or agrees to aid such other person in planning or committing it”). See also MODEL PENAL CODE, §
5.03(1) (“A person is guilty of conspiracy with another person or persons to commit a crime if with the purpose
of promoting or facilitating its commission he agrees with such other person or persons that they or one or more
of them will engage in conduct which constitutes such crime . . . .”).
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the threat they pose to national security. Part III provides a brief overview of the
federal material support statute, 18 U.S.C. § 2339B, which should serve as a model
for criminalizing the provision of material support to domestic terrorist organizations.
Part IV outlines a proposed statute to criminalize the provision of material support for
domestic terrorism, focusing on the criteria and process for designating an entity as a
“domestic terrorist organization.” Finally, Part V critically analyzes the arguments
launched against such legislative efforts to criminalize material support for domestic
terrorist organizations. Specifically, this Part will address the claim that such conduct
is protected by the First Amendment. However, this Part will demonstrate that the
Supreme Court rejected a similar First Amendment argument with respect to the
federal material support statute in Holder v. Humanitarian Law Project in 2010.17
I.

THE THREAT TO NATIONAL SECURITY

On January 6th, 2021, a domestic terrorism threat materialized when a
violent mob of Trump supporters, including members of anti-government militia
groups, stormed the U.S. Capitol. The mob interrupted a joint session of the U.S.
House of Representatives and U.S. Senate convened in separate chambers of the U.S.
Capitol building to certify the votes of the Electoral College for the 2020 Presidential
Election.18 Vice President Mike Pence, assuming his constitutional duty as President
of the Senate, presided over the Joint Session. Vice President-elect Kamala D. Harris,
in her role as a Senator representing California, was also present. Convinced that
voter fraud decided the Presidential election in favor of Joe Biden, the rioters
attempted to “Stop the Steal” and prevent the peaceful transfer of power to PresidentElect Biden. Hundreds of angry and violent Trump supporters vastly overwhelmed
U.S. Capitol Police and forced entry into the Capitol building, breaking windows and
ramming open doors.19 The rioters forcibly stormed past security barricades,
attacked, and assaulted police officers with clubs, flagpoles, stun guns, and other
weapons.20 Other crowd members encouraged and assisted the forced entry. Some
of the participants wore paramilitary gear: reinforced vests, helmets, goggles.21 They
carried mace, tear gas, and wooden clubs.22 The insurgents assaulted U.S. Capitol
Police and District of Columbia Metropolitan Police officers, killing one officer and
inflicting injuries to over 130 others.23 Approximately eighty-one Capitol police
officers and fifty-eight members of the Metropolitan Police Department were
assaulted during the attack.24 The violent siege led to the death of five participants,

17

Holder v. Humanitarian Law Project, 561 U.S. 1 (2010).
See Indictment ¶ 4, United States v. Caldwell et al., Crim. No. 21-cr-28-APM (D.D.C. Feb. 19, 2021)
[hereinafter Caldwell Indictment].
19
Id. at ¶ 7.
20
Id.
21
Id. at ¶¶ 26(f), (h).
22
Id.
23
See Daniel Villarreal, Capitol Police Union Reveals Cops Suffered “Brain Injuries,” Loss of Eye After
Pro-Trump Riot, NEWSWEEK (Jan. 27, 2021), https://www.newsweek.com/capitol-police-union-reveals-copssuffered-brain-injuries-loss-eye-after-pro-trump-riot-1564993.
24
See Caldwell Indictment, supra note 18, at ¶ 10.
18
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including a woman that the mob trampled to death.25 A Capitol Police officer shot
another woman when she attempted to make her way through a broken window of a
door outside of the Speaker’s Lobby, a hallway that contains entrances to the House
Chamber .26
Members of the media were assaulted – cameras and other equipment were
destroyed.27 The Capitol suffered millions of dollars in damage, including “broken
windows and doors, graffiti, and residue of various pepper sprays, tear gas, and fire
extinguishers deployed both by crowd members who stormed the Capitol and by
Capitol Police officers trying to restore order.”28 Law enforcement agents later
recovered two deadly pipe bombs placed outside the Democratic National Committee
and Republican National Committee headquarters.29
The violent invaders were carrying lead pipes, clubs, zip ties, explosives,
chemical irritants, and waving Trump banners and Confederate flags.30 Apparently,
the zip ties were going to be used to arrest members of Congress and charge them
with treason and election fraud.31 Fearing for their safety, Capitol Police officers
evacuated members of the House and Senate (including Vice President Pence and
Vice President-elect Harris) from their respective chambers. Members of the mob
ransacked the office of House Speaker Nancy Pelosi. The rioters also chanted “Hang
Mike Pence,” venting their anger and rage at the Vice President for his refusal to
disregard the Electoral College votes and declare Trump the winner of the presidential
election.32 Members of the angry mob stormed onto the floor of the House and Senate
chambers.33
The rioters temporarily delayed Congress’ certification of the Electoral
College vote. The Joint Session of Congress and election certification proceedings
were halted while Capitol Police and other law enforcement officers worked to restore
order and clear the Capitol of the violent insurrectionists. However, later that night,
law enforcement regained control of the Capitol, and the Joint Session reconvened,
presided over by Vice President Pence, who had remained hidden from the
insurrectionists throughout the attack.34 Ultimately, President-elect Biden was
certified as the next President of the United States.
25
The 2014 U.S. Army/Marine Corps Counterinsurgency Field Manual defines “insurgency” as the
“organized use of subversion and violence to seize, nullify, or change political control of a region.” U.S.
ARMY/MARINE CORPS INSURGENCIES AND COUNTERING INSURGENCIES, FM 3-24/MCWP 3-33.5 (May 2014).
The goal of the insurgents was to overturn the results of the 2020 presidential election. See also Jack Healy,
These Are the 5 People Who Died in the Capitol Riot, N.Y. Times (Feb. 22, 2021),
https://www.nytimes.com/2021/01/11/us/who-died-in-capitol-building-attack.html.
26
The
Journey
of
Ashli
Babbitt,
BELLINGCAT
(Jan.
8,
2021),
https://www.bellingcat.com/news/2021/01/08/the-journey-of-ashli-babbitt/ .
27
See Tiffany Hsu & Katie Robertson, Covering Pro-Trump Mobs, the News Media Became a Target,
N.Y. TIMES (Jan. 6, 2021), https://www.nytimes.com/2021/01/06/business/media/media-murder-capitolbuilding.html.
28
Caldwell Indictment, supra note 18, at ¶ 10.
29
Tim Mak & Dina Temple-Raston, What We Know About the Suspect Who Planted Bombs Before the
Capitol Riot, NPR.COM (Apr. 14, 2021), https://www.npr.org/2021/04/14/986457987/what-we-know-aboutthe-suspect-who-planted-bombs-before-the-capitol-riot .
30
Elain Godfrey, It Was Supposed to Be So Much Worse, THE ATLANTIC (Jan. 9, 2021),
https://www.theatlantic.com/politics/archive/2021/01/trump-rioters-wanted-more-violence-worse/617614/ .
31
Id.
32
Id.
33
Id.
34
Caldwell Indictment, supra note 18, at ¶ 9.
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The attack on the U.S. Capitol was not a spontaneous event. Several antigovernment militia groups played a prominent role in organizing and leading the
insurrection, including the Proud Boys and Oath Keepers. These groups engaged in
extensive planning and coordination for the January 6th operation. The Proud Boys—
a far-right nationalist group with a history of violence—were key instigators in
storming the Capitol. According to government prosecutors, the Proud Boys’
Dominic Pezzola was “one of the first to lead the charge both outside and inside the
Capitol, helping overwhelm Capitol police defenses after stealing an officer’s riot
shield.”35 Before January 6th, 2021, social media posts by the Proud Boys indicated
that they were organizing a large group that would attempt to overwhelm police
barricades and enter the Capitol building.36 One member of the Proud Boys posted a
video on Parler, which was captioned, “Let them remember the day they decided to
make war with us.”37 In a social media post, dated January 4, 2021, a Proud Boys
member declared, “We are in a war.”38 Additionally, the Proud Boys raised money
on fundraising sites to pay for protective gear and communications equipment needed
for the January 6th operation and fund their travel to Washington, D.C.39 Specifically,
the founding member of the Proud Boys Hawaii Chapter raised funds via the internet
to finance his travel to Washington, D.C. from Hawaii.40
Meanwhile, the Oath Keepers – another anti-government militia- was also
soliciting recruits to incite violence within the days following the November
presidential election. In Ohio and North Carolina, Oath Keepers conducted military
training.41 Using social media, text messaging, and messaging applications, they sent
incendiary messages to recruit followers.42 They coordinated busloads of militia
members to travel from North Carolina to Washington, D.C. The Oath Keepers
coordinated and trained with one date in mind: January 6th.
Thirteen members of the Oath Keepers who were criminally charged in the
U.S. Capitol attack began soliciting recruits for potential violence within days of the
November 2020 presidential election.43 Later, the Oath Keepers conducted military
training for members in Ohio and North Carolina and arranged the transportation of
35
Rachel Weiner & Spencer S. Hsu, Actions by Proud Boy at Capitol show ‘planning, determination, and
coordination,’
U.S.
alleges,
WASH.
POST
(Jan.
29,
2021,
7:23
PM),
https://www.washingtonpost.com/local/legal-issues/brothers-charged-eugene-goodmanchase/2021/01/29/80dec868-6239-11eb-afbe-9a11a127d146_story.html.
36
Complaint, United States v. Nordean, Crim. No. 21-cr-175 (D.D.C. Feb. 2, 2021).
37
Id.
38
Id.
39
Id.
40
Indictment ¶ 21, United States v. DeCarlo, Crim. No. 1:12-cr-73-BAH (D.D.C. Feb. 3, 2021) [hereinafter
DeCarlo Indictment].
41
Id.
42
Id.
43
There is some discrepancy as to how many Oath Keepers have been charged related to January 6th. As
of publication of this Article, some new sources have claimed twelve Oath Keepers were charged, while others
claim thirteen have been charged. This Article will operate under the assumption that thirteen Oath Keepers
have been charged. See Alan Feuer, Oath Keeper Pleads Guilty and Will Cooperate in Jan. 6 Riot Inquiry, N.Y.
TIMES (Apr. 16, 2021), https://www.nytimes.com/2021/04/16/us/politics/oath-keeper-guilty-plea.html (noting
that twelve Oath Keepers had been charged in the Capitol riots); Clare Hymes & Cassidy McDonald, Florida
member of the Oath Keepers charged with conspiracy in connection to Capitol riot, CBS NEWS (March 11,
2021), https://www.cbsnews.com/news/oath-keepers-capitol-riot-florida-conspiracy-charge-kenneth-harrelson/
(explaining that thirteen members of the Oath Keepers had been charged).
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weapons to Washington, D.C., according to U.S. authorities.44 The Oath Keepers and
other anti-government militia groups used social media, text messaging, and
messaging applications to send incendiary messages to recruit as many followers as
possible to travel to Washington, D.C. for the January 6th operation. Plans were made
to transport a busload of militia members from North Carolina to Washington, D.C.45
Members of the Oath Keepers also attended military training camps in Ohio and North
Carolina.46 One member communicated to recruits, “I need you fighting fit by
innauguration [sic].”47 She further added, “[I]t is our duty as Americans to fight, kill
and die for our rights.”48 On January 6th, once inside the Capitol, members of the
Oath Keepers communicated and coordinated their actions using a walkie-talkie
application with a curated channel named “Stop the Steal J6.”49 On this channel, one
member stated: “We have a good group. We have about 30-40 of us. We are sticking
together and sticking to the plan.”50
These militia groups did not act alone. Instead, they received material
support and money from other individuals and entities. Weeks before the attack,
right-wing activists who organized the “Stop the Steal” movement, hatched a plan to
hold a major political rally in Washington, D.C. to coincide with Congress’ vote to
certify the Electoral College votes.51 The purpose of the rally was to support former
President Trump’s challenge to the election results and prevent Congress from
certifying President-Elect Joe Biden as President, including by the use of intimidation
and force. According to media reports, a top Trump campaign fundraiser and donor
funded the rally at the Washington Ellipse that preceded the January 6th riot. “Julie
Jenkins Fancelli, a prominent donor to the Trump campaign and heir[] to the Publix
Super Markets Inc. chain,” allegedly committed $300,000 to the cause.52 Her
donation accounted for the lion’s share of the $500,000 spent to organize the rally at
the Ellipse where Trump spoke.53 Alex Jones, a far-right show host and conspiracy
theorist, personally pledged more than $50,000 in seed money for the January 6th
event.54 The Rule of Law Defense Fund (“RLDF”), a 501(c)(4) of the Republican
Attorneys General Association (“RAGA”), helped organize and fund the protest
preceding the deadly attack on the U.S. Capitol.55 The RAGA is a political
organization that helps elect Republican attorneys general and can accept unlimited
contributions from wealthy individuals and corporations. RLDF appeared in a list of

44

Caldwell Indictment, supra note 18, at ¶ 24.
Id. at ¶ 34.
46
Id. at ¶ 27.
47
Id.
48
Id. at ¶ 29.
49
Id. at ¶ 26(k).
50
Id. at ¶ 74(a).
51
Shalini Ramachandran et al., Jan. 6 Rally Funded by Top Trump Donor, Helped by Alex Jones,
Organizers Say, WALL ST. J. (Feb. 1, 2021), https://www.wsj.com/articles/jan-6-rally-funded-by-top-trumpdonor-helped-by-alex-jones-organizers-say-11612012063.
52
Id.
53
Id.
54
Id.
55
Laura Strickler & Lisa Cavazuti, Republican AGs group sent robocalls urging march to the Capitol,
NBC News (Jan. 8, 2021), https://www.nbcnews.com/news/us-news/republican-ags-group-sent-robocallsurging-march-capitol-n1253581.
45
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groups on the “March to Save America” website along with entities including Stop
the Steal, Turning Point Action, Tea Party Patriots, and others.56
Henry “Enrique” Tarrio, the national chairperson of the Proud Boys, raised
money to support the group’s participation in the “Stop the Steal” rally using
GiveSendGo.com, a Christian crowdfunding website that bills itself as “a place to
fund hope.”57 According to one media report, within a week, the “Enrique Tarrio
Defense Fund” raised more than $113,000 from 2,359 donors.58 “[A]t least $247,000
[was] raised for 24 people—including at least eight members of the Proud Boys—
who claimed…that the money was intended for travel, medical or legal expenses
connected” with the January 6th “Stop the Steal” rally.59 Nicholas Ochs, “a selfdescribed Proud Boy from Honolulu . . . raised $300 for expenses to attend the
[January] 6 rally.”60 Ochs added, “[w]e will try not to get stabbed but if one of us
does that’s when the real bucks come in so keep an eye out for that fundraiser too.”61
“A GiveSendGo fund listed under the name of Zach Rehl, … the president of the
Proud Boys Philadelphia Chapter, raised more than $5,500 for travel to the [January]
6 event.”62 Another Proud Boy member raised $1,300 to fund travel to Washington,
D.C. for the rally.63 One participant “asked donors to ‘sponsor a warrior’ and help
‘buy body armor and other protection pieces for our patriots.’”64 Ultimately, money
raised through GiveSendGo enabled members of the Proud Boys and other militia
groups to travel to Washington, D.C. and participate in the violent siege of the U.S.
Capitol.
The FBI has arrested and charged over 300 participants in the attack on the
U.S. Capitol.65 The federal charges include Obstruction of an Official Proceeding,
18 U.S.C. § 1512(c)(2), Destruction of Government Property, 18 U.S.C. §§ 1361, 2,
Theft of Government Property, 18 U.S.C. §§ 641, 2, Knowingly Entering or
Remaining in Restricted Building and Grounds, 18 U.S.C. § 1752(a)(1)–(2), and
Aiding and Abetting, 18 U.S.C. § 2.66 However, charging members of the violent
mob with offenses like trespass, theft, and obstruction-related crimes is not enough.
These criminal offenses do not accurately capture the severity of the crimes
56
Jamie Corey, Republican Attorneys General Dark Money Group Organized Protest Preceding Capitol
Mob Attack, DOCUMENTED.NET (Jan. 11, 2021), https://documented.net/2021/01/republican-attorneysgeneral-dark-money-group-organized-protest-preceding-capitol-mob-attack/.
57
Amy Brittain & David Willman, ‘A Place to Fund Hope’: How Proud Boys and Other Fringe Groups
Found Refuge on a Christian Fundraising Website, WASH. POST (Jan. 18, 2021),
https://www.washingtonpost.com/investigations/a-place-to-fund-hope-how-proud-boys-and-other-fringegroups-found-refuge-on-a-christian-fundraising-website/2021/01/18/14a536ee-574b-11eb-a08bf1381ef3d207_story.html.
58
Id.
59
Id.
60
Id.
61
Id. Ochs was arrested on a misdemeanor charge stemming from his participation in the assault on the
Capitol. With his criminal case pending, a new GiveSendGo page appeared in the “Legal Feeds for Nick Ochs”
fund. Id.
62
Id.
63
Id.
64
Id.
65
See Alanna Durkin Richer & Colleen Long, Charged in Jan. 6 riot? Yes, but prison may be another
story, ASSOC. PRESS (May 1, 2021) (detailing that over 400 individuals have been arrested related to the January
6th storming of the Capitol).
66
See Caldwell Indictment, supra note 18. See also DeCarlo Indictment, supra note 40.
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committed. The insurrectionists violently attacked the seat of our nation’s democracy
for the purpose of overturning the results of the 2020 presidential election. This
conduct far exceeds the severity of the criminal charges filed against the insurgents.
Furthermore, what about the individuals behind the scenes that provided financial
assistance, transportation, communications equipment, and other logistical support
for the insurgents? These individuals facilitated the events that occurred on January
6th and should be held accountable. However, no one has been charged with
providing material support to the Proud Boys, Oath Keepers, or other militia groups
responsible for planning and leading the attack on the Capitol.
The siege of the Capitol is not an isolated act of domestic terrorism. In
December 2020, a federal grand jury charged six men with conspiracy to kidnap
Michigan Governor Gretchen Whitmer.67 The FBI arrested six individuals for
plotting to kidnap the Democratic governor at her vacation home in northern
Michigan. The conspirators were members of a Michigan-based militia group called
the “Wolverine Watchmen,” led by Ty Gerard Garbin.68 The conspirators
participated in a “field training exercise,” where “the group practiced combat tactics,
including assaulting motor vehicles using semiautomatic assault rifles and live
ammunition.”69 At one field training exercise, the conspirators “attempted to detonate
two improvised explosive devices.”70 They also “practiced assaulting a building in
teams, and discussed tactics for fighting the Governor’s security detail with
improvised explosive devices, a projectile launcher, and other weapons,” according
to the indictment.71 One defendant instructed his co-conspirators in an encrypted
video message that “if they encountered police during a reconnaissance, they should
give the officers one opportunity to leave, and kill them if they did not comply.”72
One conspirator “ordered $4,000 worth of explosives from an undercover FBI agent
posing as a co-conspirator.”73 The co-conspirators were arrested after four members
were to meet with an FBI undercover agent and purchase explosives and other
supplies.
Six members of the Wolverine Watchmen were charged with conspiracy to
kidnap Governor Whitmer. However, it is unclear whether the Wolverine Watchmen
received material support and assistance from other individuals. The indictment
states that the conspirators conducted nighttime surveillance on Governor Whitmer’s
vacation home using two-way radios and a night-vision scope.74 Their military
training exercises involved the use of semiautomatic assault rifles and live
ammunition and surveilled where to place improvised explosive devices under a
bridge leading to Governor Whitmer’s vacation home to prevent law enforcement
officers from responding to the scene of the crime.75 Where did the militia members
67
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purchase their surveillance equipment, semi-automatic weapons, and materials used
to construct the improvised explosive devices? More importantly, did the suppliers
of the surveillance equipment and deadly weapons have knowledge that the
Wolverine Watchman were planning to kidnap the Michigan governor and engage in
violent and unlawful activity? Furthermore, who conducted the military training
exercises? Did the militia members receive training on how to construct the
improvised explosive devices? Did the individuals that provided the training have
knowledge of the kidnaping plot? Finally, did the members of the Wolverine
Watchmen receive funding from sympathetic donors who embraced their ideology
and violent agenda? If so, the individuals that provided material support to these
domestic terrorists with knowledge of their criminal objectives should be held
accountable for enabling their criminal conduct.
Federal law punishes the provision of material support or resources to a
foreign terrorist organization.76 Unfortunately, there is no such provision that
criminalizes material support to domestic terrorist groups. Also, there is currently no
process by which the government can designate domestic groups as domestic terrorist
organizations. Such a designation, as a domestic terrorist organization, would allow
the government to impose criminal and economic sanctions against these militia
groups and individuals that provide support and assistance to them. Domestic violent
extremists, including right-wing, anti-government militia groups, pose a serious threat
to national security. Moreover, the individuals and entities that knowingly provide
material support or resources to these radicalized groups enable their criminal
conduct, like the January 6th attack on the U.S. Capitol and the plot to kidnap the
Michigan governor. In fact, according to FBI Director Wray, more deaths have been
caused by DVEs that international terrorists in recent years.77 Under the current
statutory regime, 18 USC § 2339B only covers individuals and entities that provide
material support to foreign terrorist organizations – but not domestic organizations.
There is no compelling reason for our legal system to criminalize providing material
support to foreign terrorist organizations all the while turning a blind eye to similar
conduct with domestic organizations. Recent events dramatically highlight the need
to reconsider the existing legal framework for preventing and criminalizing material
support for domestic terrorism.
II.

76
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According to FBI Director Wray, racially motivated violent extremism,
mostly from white supremacists, recently has made up a majority of domestic
terrorism threats.78 Wray stated that the FBI averaged roughly 1,000 domestic
terrorism investigations annually and had recorded about 120 arrests on domestic
terrorism in 2020.79 Furthermore, Wray made clear that white supremacist and antigovernment groups were the primary threats. 80 In particular, neo-Nazi groups such
as Atomwaffen Division and the Base have been the target of the FBI.
A. OATH KEEPERS
The Oath Keepers is one of the largest radical anti-government groups in the
U.S. today. Formed following President Obama’s election in 2009 by Yale Law
School graduate Elmer Stewart Rhodes, the Oath Keepers claim to have up to 30,000
members, most of whom are former or current law enforcement officers or military.81
“Some members of the Oath Keepers believe that the federal government has been
co-opted by a cabal of elites actively trying to strip American citizens of their
rights.”82 While they will accept anyone as members, what differentiates the Oath
Keepers from other anti-government groups is their focus on recruiting current and
former military and law enforcement personnel.83 The militia’s name references the
oath sworn by members of the military and police to defend the Constitution “from
all enemies, foreign and domestic.”84 The Oath Keepers embrace the central
conspiracy theory of the anti-government “Patriot” movement of which it is a part.
“Patriots” believe that:
[T]he government will at any moment impose martial law, probably with the
aid of foreign or United Nations troops; that all guns belonging to normal
citizens will then be seized; that the resisters will be thrown into concentration
camps; and that, in the end, America will be forced into a one-world socialist
government, ‘The New World Order.’85

In 2013, the Oath Keepers announced the formation of “Citizen
Preservation” militias, intended to defend Americans against the New World Order.86
These militias have since been renamed “Civilian Preparedness Teams,” and their
goal is to “revitalize the American militia movement. . . .”87 As reported by the
78
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Southern Poverty Law Center, Rhodes expressed his views on restoring the militia in
the U.S. in a “Gods and Guns” podcast.88 He said:
We want to see a restoration of the militia in this country. . . . We think a good
first step is to have the veterans stand up in every community and go help form
and train neighborhood watches, to get people to take back into their own hands
their own personal self-defense and security.89

Heavily armed members of the Oath Keepers showed up in Ferguson,
Missouri, during the racial unrest that followed the killing of Michael Brown, an
African American teenager, by police officers. The heavily armed group members
allegedly patrolled neighborhoods to protect white-owned businesses from rioters.90
Today, the Oath Keepers have affiliates in several states across the country, including
Ohio, North Carolina, Oregon, and Montana.91
The Oath Keepers has a command structure. Their founder and leader is
Stewart Rhodes.92 The group has the ability to recruit members across the country.
While the exact number of members is unknown, the group’s membership is
estimated to be in the thousands. As previously noted, the Oath Keepers consists of
affiliated militia groups across the country. Furthermore, the Oath Keepers conducts
military training for its members. They have a command structure and ability to plan
anti–government operations, which is evident from their ability to plan, coordinate,
and execute the January 6th assault on the Capitol.93 Approximately thirteen
members of the Oath Keepers have been indicted for their participation in the January
6th, 2021 assault.94
B. PROUD BOYS
The Proud Boys was formed in 2016 by Vice Media co–founder Gavin
McInnes, a Canadian.95 The far–right, male–only group describes itself as a “pro–
Western fraternal organization for men who refuse to apologize for creating the
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modern world: aka Western Chauvinists.”96 While the actual membership is
unknown, it is believed to be in the thousands.97 The group has forty-four active
chapters across the country.98 The Proud Boys have a history of street violence,
including against Black Lives Matter demonstrators.99 In the summer of 2017, neoNazis, Klansmen, and other white supremacist groups participated in the “Unite the
Right” rally in Charlottesville, Virginia. The organizer of the event was a member of
the Proud Boys.100 In June 2018, the Proud Boys attended the “Freedom and
Courage” rally in Portland, Oregon, where they engaged in violent clashes with Black
Lives Matter protestors.101 The Proud Boys have an initiation process for new
members, which includes taking an “oath.”102 Their members pay monthly dues.103
Proud Boys members wear yellow and black apparel, as well as other clothing
adorned with Proud Boys-related logos and emblems.104
The Proud Boys have a command structure: the ability to communicate
nationwide and direct the activities of their members. The self-described chairperson
of the Proud Boys, Enrique Tarrio, directs such activities. Ethan Nordean heads the
Washington State Proud Boys.105 Beginning as early as December 2020, Proud Boys
organizers encouraged members to attend the January 6th, 2021 event in Washington,
D.C. Tarrio posted a message on the social media site Parler about the demonstration
planned that day.106 He instructed the Proud Boys on how to dress for the event to
avoid detection by law enforcement officers.107 Tarrio directed the Proud Boys to
spread across downtown Washington, D.C. organized in smaller teams.108
The Proud Boys were the single largest organized group that participated in
the January 6th siege of the U.S. Capitol.109 Two Proud Boys are accused of leading
the mob of insurrectionists.110 As of April of 2021, federal prosecutors have indicted
approximately twenty-five Proud Boys for their role in the insurrection.111 During
the attack on the Capitol, the Proud Boys wore a piece of orange tape on their hats,

96
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helmets, or backpacks to identify themselves from other members of the crowd during
the violent assault.112
In February 2021, less than a month after members of the Proud Boys joined
the violent mob that stormed the U.S. Capitol, the Canadian government designated
the entity a terrorist organization, adding the far-right group to a list of terrorist
organizations that includes al Qaeda, ISIS, and al-Shabab.113 Designation as a terrorist
organization carries financial and legal consequences. Police can seize the property
of the group and its members; banks can seize their assets.114 Additionally, it is a
crime to provide material assistance to a designated terrorist organization.115 Finally,
group members can be denied entry to Canada.116
In order to be designated a domestic terrorist organization under Canadian
law, a criminal or security intelligence report is submitted to the Minister of Public
Safety for consideration.117 The Minister then determines whether “there are
reasonable grounds to believe that (a) the entity has knowingly carried out, attempted
to carry out, participated in or facilitated a terrorist activity; or (b) the entity has
knowingly acted on behalf of, at the direction of or in association with an entity
referred to in paragraph (a).”118 If the Minister finds reasonable grounds, then she
may make a recommendation to have the entity placed on the list of terrorist
organizations.119
The Canadian government also listed the Atomwaffen Division, a neo-Nazi
group whose members participated in the violent Unite the Right rally in
Charlottesville and the Base, another neo-Nazi group. Announcing the designation
of the Proud Boys and two other domestic terrorist organizations, Public Safety
Minister Bill Blair stated, “Their violent actions and rhetoric are fueled by white
supremacy, anti-Semitism, racism, homophobia, Islamophobia and misogyny.”120
C. OTHER ANTI-GOVERNMENT GROUPS
The Three Percenters is an anti-government group. Their name is a reference
to the purported three percent of the American colonial population that rose up to
fight the British Army in the American Revolution.121 Unlike the Oath Keepers and
Proud Boys, the Three Percenters lack a hierarchical leadership and organized
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national, state, and local chapters.122 The Boogaloo Boys is considered a rightleaning, anti-government group that has connections to white supremacy and
advocates for a second civil war. “The boogaloo culture operates as a diffuse
movement rather than a traditional group organizational structure with a single
leader.”123 However, the Southern Poverty Law Center claims that the Boogaloo
Boys has chapters in at least forty states.124 Finally, there is scant public information
about the Wolverine Watchmen, the right-wing militia group that plotted to kidnap
Michigan’s governor, Gretchen Whitmer.
III.

PROVIDING MATERIAL
ORGANIZATIONS

SUPPORT

TO

FOREIGN

TERRORIST

A. STATUTORY FRAMEWORK
As part of the Violent Crime Control and Law Enforcement Act of 1994,
Congress enacted 18 U.S.C. § 2339A, making it a federal crime to provide material
support or resources “knowing or intending” that they be used in preparation for, or
in carrying out, statutorily enumerated crimes.125 Congress further recognized that
“[c]utting off ‘material support or resources’ from terrorist organizations deprives
them of the means with which to carry out acts of terrorism and potentially leads to
their demise.”126
Two years later, Congress enacted 18 U.S.C. § 2339B, criminalizing the
provision of material support or resources to a foreign terrorist organization. In
Humanitarian Law Project v. Gonzales, the court examined the legislative history of
18 U.S.C. § 2339B, stating:
Congress enacted § 2339B in order to close a loophole left by § 2339A.
Congress, concerned that terrorist organizations would raise funds “under the
cloak of a humanitarian or charitable exercise,” sought to pass legislation that
would “severely restrict the ability of terrorist organizations to raise much
needed funds for their terrorist acts within the United States.” As § 2339A was
limited to donors intending to further the commission of specific federal
offenses, Congress passed § 2339B to encompass donors who acted without the
intent to further federal crimes.127

Section 2339B requires proof that the defendant “(1) knowingly provided
material support[;] (2) to an organization designated as a foreign terrorist
organization[; and] (3) with knowledge of the organization’s status as an FTO, or
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knowing that it engages in terrorism.”128 The defendant must have knowledge that
the foreign organization has been designated an FTO by the Secretary of State or that
the organization has engaged or engages in “terrorist activity” or “terrorism.”129
However, the government is not required to prove the defendant acted with the
specific intent to commit a terrorist attack or to further the ideological goals of the
terrorist group.130 Under § 2339B, a defendant who acts with knowledge of the
foreign entity’s connections to terrorism is criminally liable, even if harboring a
benign intent or purpose.
While Congress’s principal aim was to deprive FTOs of funding, the statute
punishes other forms of material support. The term “material support or resources”
means:
Any property, tangible or intangible, or service, including currency or monetary
instruments or financial securities, financial services, lodging, training, expert
advice or assistance, safe-houses, false documentation or identification,
communications equipment, facilities, weapons, lethal substances, explosives,
personnel (1 or more individuals who may be or include oneself), and
transportation, except medicine or religious materials.131

The material support statute is unprecedented in breadth and scope. In
essence, § 2339B is a relaxed aiding and abetting statute. The statute does not punish
the perpetrator of a terrorist attack, but instead it punishes enablers who provide
assistance to the terrorist organization. Under traditional accomplice liability, the
aider and abettor must share the intent of the principal and intend the commission of
the target offense. However, under the material support statute, the government only
has to prove that the offender acted with knowledge of the recipient’s membership in
an FTO or association with a foreign entity engaged in terrorist activity. The offender
is liable even if he does not embrace the political objectives of the foreign group or
lacks the intent to further the group’s illicit activities. For example, a gun dealer who
sells weapons to an FTO with the requisite knowledge is liable even if his actions
were motivated solely to make a profit from the commercial transaction. Similarly,
a person who makes a financial contribution to members of an FTO regardless of his
or her purpose or intent, violates the material support statute.
Under the statute, “[w]hoever knowingly provides material support or
resources to [an FTO], or attempts or conspires to do so,” can be convicted.132 Thus,
not only does § 2339B punish the actual provision of material support or resources to
an FTO, but it also creates criminal liability for the inchoate offenses of attempt and
conspiracy to do so. A person who attempts to provide support to an FTO, as well as
someone who conspires to assist an FTO – but falls short –
128
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is punishable under the statute. The material support statute does not require proof
that the defendant facilitated a terrorist attack or even that the FTO received assistance
from the defendant. The defendant is liable solely if he attempts or conspires to
provide such assistance.
B. FTO DESIGNATION PROCESS
The authority to designate an entity a “foreign terrorist organization” resides
with the Secretary of State.133 Under 8 U.S.C. § 1189, the Secretary of State, in
consultation with the Secretary of Treasury and Attorney General, may designate a
foreign organization upon finding that:
(A) the organization is a foreign organization;
(B) the organization engages in terrorist activity (as defined in
section 1182(a)(3)(B) of this title) or terrorism (as defined in
section 2656f(d)(2) of Title 22) or retains the capability and
intent to engage in terrorist activity or terrorism; and
(C) the terrorist activity or terrorism threatens national security or
security of United States nationals.134
In making an FTO designation, the Secretary of State compiles an
“administrative record” and makes “findings” based on this record.135 The Secretary
may base this designation on classified information. And the designated party is not
entitled to notice prior to the designation.136 Seven days before designating an
organization as an FTO, the Secretary of State must submit to key congressional
leaders a “classified communication” detailing the Secretary’s findings.137 The State
Department then publishes the designation in the Federal Register.138 Once an entity
has been designated an FTO, that designation may be revoked in three ways:
(1) Congress blocks or revokes a designation, 8 U.S.C. § 1189(a)(5);
(2) the Secretary revokes the designation based on a finding that
changed circumstances or national security warrant a revocation, 8
U.S.C. § 1189(a)(6)A); or (3) the D.C. Circuit sets aside the
designation under 8 U.S.C. § 1189(c)(3).139
The legal consequences of being designated an FTO are severe. First,
financial institutions must freeze any and all FTO assets located within the
jurisdiction of the U.S.140 Second, representatives and members of the FTO are
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prohibited from traveling to the U.S.141 Finally, § 2339B imposes severe criminal
sanctions for providing material support or resources to an FTO.142
IV.

PROVIDING MATERIAL
ORGANIZATIONS

SUPPORT

TO

DOMESTIC

TERRORIST

While federal law criminalizes the provision of material support to a foreign
terrorist organization, there is no equivalent statute that criminalizes material support
to domestic terrorist organizations. Furthermore, there is no legal mechanism for the
FBI or other government agency to label groups as domestic terrorist organizations
and impose economic sanctions against such entities. Thus, individuals can sell
military-style weapons and explosives to violent right-wing extremist groups, provide
their members military-style training, make generous monetary donations to support
their cause, and provide other forms of material support with impunity.
Absent
evidence that the actor had the intent or knowledge that his or her material support
would be used to commit a particular crime, such conduct is lawful. However, even
the provision of material support with benign intent can promote acts of terrorism.
A. STATUTE OVERVIEW
To address this serious gap in the law, Congress should enact a domestic
material support statute. The new statute would make it a crime to provide “material
support or resources” to a “domestic terrorist organization” (“DTO”). The statute
would adopt the same definition of “material support or resources” included in the
federal material support statute, 18 U.S.C. § 2339A.143 Furthermore, the statute
would require proof that the accused acted with knowledge that the organization was
designated a “domestic terrorist organization” or engages in, or has engaged in, acts
of “domestic terrorism” as defined in 18 U.S.C. § 2331(5).144 However, the
government would not be required to prove that the defendant had the specific intent
to further a domestic terrorist organization’s illicit activity.145
Under the proposed statute, any financial institution that knows it has
possession of, or control over, any funds in which a DTO, or its agent, has an
interest146 would be required to freeze those funds. Financial institutions would also
be required to report the existence of these funds to the Treasury Department. The
statute that prohibits the provision of material support to an FTO has a similar
provision .147 Additionally, any financial institution that knowingly fails to comply
with the blocking and reporting requirements would be subject to a civil penalty.
Financial institutions that violate §2339B(2)(b) trigger a $50,000 penalty per
violation or a penalty worth twice the amount of funds the financial institution was
141
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required to retain control over. 148 A similar penalty should be imposed on banks for
failing to block the assets of DTOs and report the existence of such funds to the
Treasury Department.
Whoever violates this DTO statute should be subject to a term of
imprisonment of not more than twenty years, and, if death of any person results, shall
be imprisoned for any term of years or for life.149 However, a lesser penalty should
be provided for the provision of de minimis support to a DTO. De minimis
determinations must be made on a case-by-case basis: aid and assistance that would
not facilitate the illicit activities of a DTO in a significant manner should be
prosecuted as a misdemeanor offense. These misdemeanor offenses should result in
a maximum penalty of one-year imprisonment. For example, providing a single
monetary donation of less than $500 to a DTO on a GoFundMe site should subject
the offender misdemeanor liability. Criminal prosecution for these lesser offenses
would still have a deterrent effect and prevent sympathetic donors from providing
monetary assistance to a DTO. On the other hand, the sale of military-style weapons
or explosives to a DTO, with knowledge of the DTO’s designation or knowledge of
their terrorist activities should warrant felony prosecution. This type of material
support is essential to facilitating the group’s terrorist activities. While there is clearly
no bright line on what constitutes de minimis support, the statute should distinguish
between minor and major assistance to a DTO.
B. DTO DESIGNATION PROCESS
Not every group that engages in violent conduct should be designated a DTO
under the proposed statute. Only groups that threaten national security should be
given that designation. The government’s decision to designate a group a DTO
should be guided by objective factors, rather than a subjective determination. At least
three factors are highly probative on the matter: (1) the ideology of the group; (2)
organizational structure of the entity; and (3) its history of violent behavior. For
example, a right-wing, extremist paramilitary group dedicated to overthrowing the
U.S. government that uses violence to oppose government action poses a grave
national security risk. On the other hand, a criminal organization may threaten public
safety, but does not necessarily pose a national security threat. The Racketeer
Influenced and Corrupt Organizations (“RICO”) statute punishes enterprise
criminality.150 A RICO association-in-fact enterprise requires three structural
features: “a purpose, relationships among [those associated with the enterprise], and
longevity sufficient to permit [these] associates to pursue the enterprise’s purpose.”151
However, not every association-in-fact enterprise engaged in criminal activity
presents a threat to national security. For example, a RICO enterprise engaged in
illicit drug trafficking, human trafficking or health care fraud would not constitute a
national security threat. Ultimately, the purpose of these criminal groups is to make a
profit by illicit means, not challenge government authority or policy by threats or acts
of violence. Thus, the standard for making a DTO designation should be much higher.
148
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First, when considering whether to designate an entity a DTO, the
government agency should consider the ideology of the group. Specifically, what is
the avowed mission and purpose of the group? If a domestic entity is committed to
overthrowing the government, challenging government policy by violent means, or
killing members of ethnic, national, or religious groups, these organizations raise
serious national security concerns. In fact, targeting someone for killing because of
their nationality, ethnicity, race, or religion may constitute genocide. Genocide is
defined as killing or causing serious bodily harm to members of a national, ethnical,
racial, or religious group with the “intent to destroy, in whole or in part,” members
the group.152 Certainly, white supremacist and other hate groups that commit acts
dangerous to human life intended to intimidate, coerce, or destroy members of ethnic
or religious groups should be designated a DTO.
Second, the organizational structure of the group is probative on the issue of
national security. For example, a small, loosely organized, and dispersed group is
unlikely to pose a danger to national security. On the other hand, domestic groups
with a command structure and leadership control, and the ability to plan and execute
violent attacks pose a greater security threat. Other probative factors include the size
of the group, whether it governs by rules, its recruitment and fundraising capabilities,
the existence of a communications infrastructure, whether it conducts military
training, and its members possess military-style weapons. Another consideration is
the complexity and sophistication of the acts of violence committed by the domestic
organization.
Whether to designate an entity as a DTO should also focus on the violent
behavior of the group. Designation should require proof that the group engages in
acts of domestic terrorism as defined by 18 U.S.C. § 2331(5). Specific considerations
include the number of terrorist attacks and acts of violence committed by the group.
Other highly relevant factors include the number of casualties and extent of serious
injuries caused by these attacks. The extent of the destruction of property is probative
as well. The larger the number of terrorist attacks and resulting casualties, the greater
the threat to national security posed by the entity. Another consideration is the
complexity of these groups’ terror plots. Groups that are able to plan and execute
complex terrorist attacks pose a greater danger to national security. Ultimately, there
should be a direct correlation between the ideology, organizational structure, and
violent history of the group and the threat to national security. Only groups that pose
a serious risk to national security should be designated a DTO.
Applying these three factors, a compelling case can be made for designating
the Oath Keepers as a DTO. First, the Oath Keepers is an anti-government militia.
Their members believe that the government is going to impose martial law, suspend
the Second Amendment and seize all privately owned guns, and place antigovernment protestors in concentration camps. They are committed to taking back
their country by violent means, which was demonstrated on January 6th, where the
Oath Keepers stormed the U.S. Capitol and assaulted and injured dozens of Capitol
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Police and District of Columbia police officers. Ultimately, the ideology and avowed
purpose of the Oath Keepers raise serious national security concerns.
Second, the organizational structure of the Oath Keepers supports
designating them as a DTO. Stewart Rhodes is the leader of the organization
exercising command and control over its members, including their activities in
Washington, D.C. on January 6th. Media reports indicate that Rhodes was in regular
cell phone communication with his subordinates during the January 6th attack on the
U.S. Capitol, directing and coordinating the movement and activities of the Oath
Keepers on the ground. The Oath Keepers also provide military-style training to their
members. Additionally, the Oath Keepers have nationwide recruitment capabilities.
They claim to have 30,000 members with chapters located in several states across the
country.
Finally, the Oath Keepers have a history of threats and acts of violence. Their
members have attended protests in Ferguson, Missouri, Portland, Oregon, and
elsewhere heavily armed with military-style weapons. Several of their members
engaged in violent confrontations with Black Live Matter demonstrators and
members of Antifa. Their violent propensities were clearly demonstrated on January
6th where their members dressed for military battle entered the U.S. Capitol by force,
attacking federal police officers with deadly force, and damaging government
property in an effort to prevent the peaceful transfer of presidential power. Their
actions constituted an attack on democracy which poses a serious threat to national
security.153
V. THE ARGUMENTS AGAINST ENACTING A DOMESTIC MATERIAL-SUPPORT
STATUTE
Two arguments have been raised against criminalizing the provision of
material support to designated domestic terrorist organizations. First, opponents
argue that the provision of material support to domestic terrorists is already prohibited
by 18 U.S.C. § 2339A. Therefore, enacting a new domestic terrorism statute is
unnecessary. Second, the anti-legislation crowd argues that a domestic materialsupport statute would violate freedom of speech guaranteed by the First Amendment.
Both arguments must be rejected for several reasons. First, § 2339A imposes a
heightened mens rea requirement. This higher state of mind requirement makes it
difficult to convict secondary actors under that statute. Second, § 2339A is limited in
scope and does not cover several of the crimes committed by the January 6th
insurrectionists and perpetrators of the plot to kidnap Michigan Governor Whitmer.
Next, in Holder v. Humanitarian Law Project the Supreme Court explicitly rejected
a similar First Amendment claim involving § 2339B, providing material support to a
foreign terrorist organization.154
A. 18 U.S.C. § 2339A
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Under § 2339A, it is a federal crime to provide material support or resources
“knowing or intending” that such support or resources are to be “used in preparation
for, or in carrying out” one or more statutorily enumerated crimes.155 The enumerated
crimes are varied and include such offenses as bombing a place of public use,
government facility, public transportation system, or infrastructure facility, § 2332f,
killing an officer or employee of the United States while such person is engaged in or
on account of the performance of official duties, § 1114, and hostage taking, § 1203.
Section 2339A does not distinguish between foreign and domestic terrorist
organizations. In fact, the statute does not require that the recipient of the material
support be a member of any terrorist group. Instead, the intended beneficiary could
be a lone wolf terrorist, or someone engaged in criminal activity unrelated to any
political, religious, or racial ideology. Section 2339A does not focus on the status of
the recipient (i.e., whether the accused is a member of a designated terrorist
organization) but rather on the defendant’s mental state. The statute requires that the
defendant act with knowledge or intent that the material support be used in
preparation for or to commit a statutorily enumerated crime. The perpetrator’s
scienter is essential to proving a violation of § 2339A. The accused is not liable under
the statute unless he acts with the requisite mental state.
The heightened mens rea requirement imposes a significant legal obstacle for
successful prosecution under the statute. For example, an individual could sell
military-style weapons to members of a violent, extremist anti-government militia
with knowledge of the militia group’s extremist ideology and violent propensities.
However, unless the weapons dealer had knowledge that the members of the militia
group were going to use the firearms to engage in criminal conduct prohibited in §
2339A or intended the guns to be used for such purpose, he would not be liable under
the statute. Moreover, the statute requires actual, subjective knowledge. A violation
of the statute could not be sustained on proof that the gun dealer “should have known”
that the weapons were going to be used for a criminal purpose. The statute requires
proof of actual knowledge or intent, not mere negligence. Thus, the gun dealer could
likely avoid liability by merely claiming that he acted with a benign purpose such as
making a profit from the sale of the weapons or lacked knowledge of the militia
group’s purpose for acquiring the firearms. In the absence of additional incriminating
evidence demonstrating the defendant’s knowledge or intent, the accused would
likely escape prosecution under the statute.
Any proposed domestic terrorism statute should include a relaxed mens rea
standard, similar to that required for a violation of § 2339B. Section 2339B requires
that “a person must have knowledge that the organization is a designated terrorist
organization . . . that the organization has engaged or engages in terrorist activity . . .
or that the organization has engaged or engages in terrorism.”156 Any proposed
domestic terrorism statute should require proof that the accused have knowledge that
the organization is a designated “domestic terrorist organization” or has engaged or
engages in acts of domestic terrorism as defined by § 2331(5). It would not require
proof of the heightened “knowing or intending” standard in § 2339A.
155
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Prosecuting secondary actors under § 2339A is problematic for one other
reason. The enumerated offenses included in the statute are limited in scope. To date,
the most serious charge filed against the participants in the attack against the U.S.
Capitol is obstruction of an official proceeding, a violation of 18 U.S.C. §
1512(a)(2)(A). The statute authorizes imprisonment of not more than twenty years.157
However, the obstruction of justice statute is not a predicate crime enumerated in §
2339A. Therefore, even if the persons that provided material support and resources
to the insurrectionists acted with the requisite mens rea, such individuals could not be
prosecuted under 18 U.S.C. § 2339A. Another glaring omission from the list of
enumerated offenses is seditious conspiracy, 18 U.S.C. § 2384. If people sympathetic
to the cause of the Proud Boys or Oath Keepers gave them money or arranged their
transportation to Washington, D.C. with knowledge of their plan to violently attack
the U.S. Capitol, such individuals could not be prosecuted under 18 U.S.C. § 2339A.
Seditious conspiracy is not a predicate offense under § 2339A.
Section 2339A does not prohibit the provision of military-style training to
DTOs. A military veteran could provide weapons and explosives training to members
of a DTO without violating § 2339A. Section 2339D prohibits the receipt of militarystyle training from an organization designated as an FTO.158 This offense is included
in the list of enumerated offenses under § 2339A. However, there is no equivalent
statutory provision for the provision of military training to a DTO. In this scenario,
neither the persons providing the military training nor the members of the DTO
receiving the training are guilty of violating any federal statute. Thus, the secondary
actors that provided material support or resources to the insurrectionists on January 6
are not going to face prosecution under § 2339A for their role in enabling the violent
assault on the U.S. Capitol.
Finally, conspiracy to commit kidnaping, 18 U.S.C. § 1201(c), is not
included as a predicate offense in 18 U.S.C § 2339A. Therefore, any individuals that
provided material support or resources to members of the violent militia group that
conspired to kidnap Michigan Governor Whitmer could not be prosecuted under §
2339A. This is another glaring omission in the federal material support statute.
Ultimately, 18 U.S.C. § 2339A has no meaningful application against the secondary
actors that participated in either the January 6, 2021 attack on the U.S. Capitol or the
conspiracy to kidnap the Michigan governor, two of the most egregious acts of
domestic terrorism since the Oklahoma City bombing in 1995 that killed 168 innocent
people, including nineteen
children. Under the current legal regime, individuals
can provide material support or resources to domestic right-wing extremists with
knowledge of their anti-government and racist ideology and violent tendencies with
impunity. The need for a federal statute criminalizing material support to DTOs is
therefore urgent and compelling.
B. FIRST AMENDMENT CONCERNS
The critics of a domestic material support statute maintain that it would
violate freedom of speech guaranteed by the First Amendment. In Holder v.
157
158

Id. § 1512(3)(C).
Id. § 2339D.

Journal of Legislation

31

Humanitarian Law Project, the Supreme Court rejected a similar argument. 159 In
Humanitarian Law Project, plaintiffs sought to provide support for the lawful, nonviolent activities of the Kurdistan Workers’ Party (also known as the Partiya Karkeran
Kurdistan, or PKK) and the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE). These groups
had been designated FTOs under 18 U.S.C. § 2339B.160 Plaintiffs challenged §
2339B’s prohibition of four types of material support; “training,” “expert advice or
assistance,” “service,” and “personnel.”161 Plaintiffs claimed that § 2339B prohibited
them from engaging in certain activity. With respect to the PKK, plaintiffs sought to
(1) train members of the PKK on the use of humanitarian and international law to
peacefully resolve disputes; (2) engage in political advocacy on behalf of the Kurds
living in Turkey; and (3) teach PKK members how to petition various representative
bodies such as the United Nations for relief.162 With respect to the LTTE, plaintiffs
intended to (1) train members of the LTTE to present claims for tsunami-related aid
to mediators and international bodies; (2) provide legal assistance in negotiating
peace agreements between the LTTE and the Sri Lankan government; and (3)
participate in political advocacy on behalf of Tamils who live in Sri Lanka.163
Plaintiffs maintained that applying the material support statute to prevent
them from engaging in these activities violated the Constitution. In particular, they
claimed that the statute infringes on their rights to freedom of speech and
association.164 The Court rejected plaintiffs’ First Amendment arguments, holding
that the material support statute was constitutional as applied to plaintiffs’ desired
activities.165
The Court addressed the particular speech plaintiffs proposed to undertake.
First, plaintiffs sought to train members of the PKK on how to use humanitarian and
international law to peacefully resolve disputes. The Court held that Congress can,
consistent with the First Amendment, prohibit “training.” The Court stated: “It is
wholly foreseeable that the PKK would use the ‘specific skill[s]’ that plaintiffs
proposed to impart, [§] 2339A(b)(2), as part of a broader strategy to promote
terrorism.”166
Second, plaintiffs proposed to teach PKK members how to petition various
international organizations for relief and teach the LTTE how to present claims for
tsunami-related aid to international bodies. The Court stated that the government may
ban this type of speech because it teaches the FTO how to acquire “relief,” which
159
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could include monetary aid.167 “Money is fungible,” the Court noted, and “Congress
logically concluded that money a terrorist group . . . obtains using the techniques
plaintiffs propose to teach could be redirected to funding the group’s violent
activities.”168
Finally, plaintiffs proposed engaging in political advocacy on behalf of the
Kurds living in Turkey and participating in political advocacy on behalf of the Tamils
residing in Sri Lanka.169 The Court held that the material support statute does not ban
“‘pure political speech.’”170 Under the statute, according to the Court, “plaintiffs may
say anything they wish on any topic[,]” “speak and write freely about the PKK and
LTTE,” and “advocate” on their behalf.171 The Court noted that “‘[t]he statute does
not prohibit independent advocacy or expression of any kind.’”172 And the Court
opined that “Congress has not . . . sought to suppress ideas or opinions in the form of
‘pure political speech.’”173 Rather, the Court said that the statute prohibits “‘material
support,’ which most often does not take the form of speech at all.”174 “And when it
does,” the Court clarified, “the statute is carefully drawn to cover only a narrow
category of speech to, under the direction of, or in coordination with foreign groups
that the speaker knows to be terrorist organizations.”175
Applying a strict scrutiny standard of review, the Court found that the
“Government’s interest in combating terrorism is an urgent objective of the highest
order.”176 Plaintiffs countered, arguing that the statute was not narrowly tailored to
achieve that interest because their support would advance only the legitimate, nonviolent activities of the designated terrorist organizations.177 The Court dismissed
this argument, noting that when Congress enacted § 2339B, it made specific findings
regarding the serious threat posed by international terrorism. One of the findings, the
Court observed, explicitly rejects plaintiffs’ contention that their support would not
further the terrorist activities of the two FTOs. Congress found: “foreign
organizations that engage in terrorist activity are so tainted by their criminal conduct
that any contribution to such an organization facilitates that conduct.”178 The Court
further declared that Congress’s reference to “any contribution” was not limited to
monetary support but reflects “a determination that any form of material support
furnished ‘to’ a foreign terrorist organization should be barred.”179 Even material
support meant to promote lawful conduct can further acts of terrorism by “free[ing]
up other resources within the organization that may be put to violent ends.”180 The
Court observed, “[t]errorist organizations do not maintain organizational ‘firewalls’
167
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that would prevent or deter … sharing and commingling of support and benefits.”181
The Court stated that “money is fungible.”182 Funds raised for charitable or nonviolent purposes could be redirected to purchase arms and explosives. Thus, all
contributions to FTOs further their illegal activities.
In response to vagueness concerns, Congress narrowed the statute and
defined the terms “training,” “personnel,” and “expert advice or assistance.”183
Furthermore, in an attempt to address First Amendment concerns, Congress created
limited exceptions to the ban on material support, excluding, for example, medicine
and religious materials, the Court observed.184 Congress also avoided any restriction
on “independent advocacy.”185 Only conduct that is directed, coordinated with, or
under the control of an FTO is prohibited under the statute. The Court declared:
“Independent advocacy that might be viewed as promoting the group’s legitimacy is
not covered.”186
Finally, the Court rejected plaintiffs’ freedom of association argument. The
statute does not penalize mere association with an FTO or the vigorous promotion of
the political goals of the group, the Court stated.187 Instead, what § 2339B prohibits
is the act of giving material support to a designated FTO. The Court held that “in
regulating the particular forms of support that plaintiffs seek to provide to foreign
terrorist organizations, Congress has pursued that objective consistent with the
limitations of the First and Fifth Amendments.”188
The Court’s reasoning in Humanitarian Law Project applies with equal force
to criminalizing material support to domestic terrorist organizations. First, the
government’s interest in combating domestic terrorism is also “an urgent objective of
the highest order.”189 According to FBI Director Wray, violent anti-government
militia groups pose a serious threat to national security.190 Furthermore, right-wing
militia groups played a central role in planning and leading the January 6th attack on
the U.S. Capitol.191 Thirteen members of the Oath Keepers have been charged with
a variety of crimes stemming from the violent siege of the Capitol, most prominently
conspiracy to break into the Capitol and interfere with Congress’s certification of the
181
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Electoral College votes.192 And as of May 3rd, at least twelve members of the Proud
Boys are facing federal criminal charges for their role in entering the U.S. Capitol by
force and attempting to stop, delay, and hinder the congressional proceedings
occurring that day.193 This violent conduct resulted in killing five individuals and
assaulting over 130 U.S. Capitol and D.C. Metropolitan police officers and injuring
dozens of others.194 The insurrectionists further threatened the lives of members of
Congress, who had convened in a joint session to certify the Electoral College votes.
Members of the pro-Trump mob also intended to kill Vice President Mike Pence,
chanting “Hang Mike Pence” as they rampaged through the halls of the U.S.
Capitol.195
Members of a Michigan-based anti-government militia group plotted to
kidnap and kill Governor Gretchen Whitmer. The terrorist plot was thwarted after
co-conspirators were arrested attempting to purchase deadly explosives from an
undercover FBI agent. The explosives were going to be used to execute the
kidnapping plot. Focusing on the January 6th siege of the U.S. Capitol and deadly
scheme to kidnap the Michigan governor, the government clearly has a compelling
interest in preventing domestic terrorism.
Second, banning material support to a designated DTO would further the
government’s compelling interest. In enacting § 2339B, Congress found that foreign
organizations that engage in terrorist activity are “so tainted by their criminal conduct
that any contribution to such an organization facilitates that conduct.”196 The same
can be said for the provision of material support to domestic terror groups, including
financial assistance. Money is fungible and regardless of the intent of the donor, such
funds “could be redirected to funding the group’s violent activities.”197 Other forms
of assistance such as military-style training and provision of weapons and explosives
could also be used to promote terrorism and should be banned.198
Third, a domestic material support statute modeled after 18 U.S.C. § 2339B
would not violate freedom of speech guaranteed by the First Amendment. The
Supreme Court has consistently held that the First Amendment does not protect
speech directed at overthrowing the government by force.199 “These cases make clear
that a line exists between expressions of belief, which are protected by the First
Amendment, and threatened or actual uses of force, which are not.”200 Furthermore,
numerous federal crimes can be committed by speech alone. For example, 18 U.S.C.
192
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§ 2 makes it unlawful to “counsel[], command[], induce[,] or procure[]” the
commission of an offense against the United States.201 Section 371 makes it a crime
to “conspire . . . to commit any offense against the United States.”202 Additionally, §
373 makes it a crime to “solicit[], command[], induce[], or otherwise endeavor[] to
persuade” another person to commit a crime of violence.203 All of these offenses are
committed through speech. “[I]f the evidence shows that the speeches crossed the
line into criminal solicitation, procurement of criminal activity, or conspiracy to
violate the laws, the prosecution is permissible.”204 In United States v. Rahman, the
Second Circuit rejected the defendants’ First Amendment challenges to prosecution
under the seditious conspiracy statute, 18 U.S.C. § 2384.205 The court stated,
“[n]otwithstanding that political speech and religious exercise are among the
activities most jealously guarded by the First Amendment, one is not immunized from
prosecution for such speech-based offenses merely because one commits them
through the medium of political speech or religious preaching.”206
A domestic material statute would not violate First Amendment freedom of
speech because it does not prohibit independent advocacy or expression of any kind.
A domestic material support statute should only cover a narrow category of speech
“under the direction of, or in coordination with” domestic groups that the speaker
knows to be domestic terrorist organizations.207 Individuals that support and
sympathize with the political ideology and racist views of these domestic
organizations could speak and write freely about these groups. These individuals
could engage in peaceful protests against the government and promote white
supremacy and anti-Semitism. This conduct would not be banned by the statute. A
proposed statute should not restrict or prohibit independent political advocacy of any
kind.
Finally, the domestic material support statute would not violate freedom of
association under the First Amendment. The statute should not penalize mere
association with a domestic terrorist organization or prohibit vigorously promoting
and supporting the political goals of the group.208 Any burden on freedom of
association is justified for the same reasons articulated for prohibiting speech
intended to incite violence or promote terrorism.209 Furthermore, any groups
designated as a domestic terrorist organization could seek judicial review of the
designation.
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CONCLUSION
Domestic violent, extremist groups motivated and inspired by “a mix of
sociopolitical, ideological, and personal grievances against their targets” pose a clear
and present danger to national security.210 At least two right-wing, anti-government
militia groups, the Proud Boys and Oath Keepers, assumed a prominent role in the
attack on the U.S. Capitol. Members of a Michigan-based militia group allegedly
conspired to kidnap the Michigan governor. Both incidents threatened national
security. These violent, conspiratorial plots were aided and abetted by other
individuals. Currently, federal laws are inadequate to hold the enablers and
facilitators of these violent crimes accountable.
To address this serious gap in the law, Congress should enact a statute
criminalizing material support to DTOs. The proposed statute should be modeled
after 18 U.S.C. § 2339B, which prohibits the provision of material support to a foreign
terrorist organization. Whoever knowingly provides material support for terrorism
should be criminally prosecuted. The law should not distinguish between whether
the group is a foreign or domestic terrorist organization. In either case, the provision
of material support promotes terrorism.
In Holder v. Humanitarian Law Project, the Supreme Court upheld the
constitutionality of § 2339B against a claim that it violated freedom of speech and
association guaranteed by the First Amendment.211 The Court held that the material
support statute does not punish independent political advocacy, but only speech under
the direction and control of an FTO. The reasoning of the Court has equal application
to the proposed domestic material support and would therefore withstand a First
Amendment challenge.
Furthermore, to address First Amendment concerns, the proposed statute
should impose a more rigorous standard for designating a “domestic terrorist
organization” than is currently required for designating a foreign terrorist
organization. Not every criminal group that commits acts of violence should be
designated a DTO. Only domestic groups that pose a grave threat to national security
should be designated as such. Whether a group threatens national security should be
based on three factors: (1) the professed ideology of the group; (2) its organizational
structure; and (3) documented history of violence.
If the domestic organization’s mission is to overthrow the government, kill
and kidnap elected officials, and use unlawful force to oppose government policy, the
group poses a danger to national security. Violent hate groups that target individuals
for killing based on their ethnicity, nationality, or religion pose a similar threat.
Additionally, domestic groups with a chain-of-command structure and ability to plan
and execute violent attacks pose a grave security threat. The other important
designation factor is the group’s history of violent behavior and whether it engages
in domestic terrorism. If a domestic group embraces a violent, extremist ideology, is
well organized, and engages in acts of domestic terrorism, the group should be
designated a DTO. The provision of material support and resources to such
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organizations should be banned and criminalized. Congress should immediately
enact legislation prohibiting material support to domestic terrorists. Such legislation
is needed to prevent acts of domestic terrorism and protect national security.
Criminalizing material support to domestic terrorist organizations is a national
security imperative.

